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‘When plunder becomes a way of life for a group of men living in society, 
they create for themselves, in the course of time, a legal system that authorizes 
it and a moral code that glorifies it.’ (Frédéric Bastiat) 
 
 
Introduction: Moral Economy 
 
As French political economist Frédéric Bastiat appreciated, the origins of our 
contemporary economy had little to do with deliberations on what might be fair and 
morally justified and a lot to do with power. Yet our basic economic institutions are 
generally portrayed as legitimate and as accepted as such, though more as ‘facts of 
life’ than as rationally justified, and this acceptance is important for their continued 
existence. It would be a mistake to assume that because our political economic 
architecture is largely a product of power that there is no point in considering it in 
terms of moral and ethical questions of justice, fairness and human well-being. Unless 
we consider these things, we have little basis for criticising anything. 
 
Amartya Sen once drew a distinction between the ‘engineering’ and the ‘ethical’ 
approaches to economics (Sen, 1991). The former treats economies as machines that 
work in various ways that need to be described and explained, and which economists 
can fix if they work badly. The ethical approach treats economies as sets of social 
relations and practices that may be good or bad on moral and ethical grounds and 
need to be assessed in those terms. In the days of classical political economy, the two 
were seamlessly merged. But since that time, the emergence of separate disciplines in 
the social sciences has led to an unhappy divorce of positive (i.e. descriptive and 
explanatory) thought from normative or evaluative thought. While most social 
sciences have tried to expel the latter, it has become ghettoized in political theory, 
which has returned the compliment by discussing ideal models of distribution that 
ignore the injustices of actually-existing economic practices and situations (Sayer, 
2007). This approach tends to reduce the social relations through which economies 
work to transactions between free-standing individuals pursuing their self-interest and 
encountering others in markets. Hence the work of the likes of Rawls or Dworkin or 
Sandel poses little or no threat to the established political economic order. (Capitalism 
or exploitation and parasitism are rarely mentioned in such literature.) The social 
relations through which economic activities are organized – employer and employee, 
landlord and tenant, creditor and debtor, tax-payer and recipient of tax-funded goods, 
carer and cared-for – are ignored or absorbed into generic market relations, allowing 
any injustices constituted by these social relations to be passed over. 
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‘Moral economy’ attempts to correct this. Like ‘history’, the term ‘moral economy’ 
can refer either to an approach or to an object. As an approach, moral economy is 
mostly importantly about assessing the moral justifications of basic features of 
actually-existing economic organization, in particular property relations and what 
institutions and individuals are allowed and required to do. Here questions of justice 
are to the fore. It also examines and assesses the moral influences on, and implications 
of, economic activities, and how economic practices and relations are evaluated as fair 
or unfair, good or bad, by those involved in them. Moral economy treats the economy 
not merely as a machine which sometimes breaks down, but as a complex set of 
relationships between people, and between people and nature, increasingly stretched 
around the world, in which they act as producers of goods and services, investors, 
recipients of various kinds of income, lenders and borrowers, and as taxpayers and 
consumers.  As social beings we are dependent on others, most basically for care 
during those substantial periods of our lives when we cannot provide for ourselves. 
Dependence can take good or bad forms – life-enhancing (for example, good care) or 
oppressive (for example, usury). As a critical approach, moral economy goes beyond 
the usual focus on irrationality and systemic breakdown, to focus on injustice and the 
moral justifications of taken-for-granted rights and practices. For instance, it’s not 
only about how much people in different positions in the economy should get paid for 
what they do, but whether those positions are legitimate in the first place. Is it right 
that they’re allowed to do what they’re doing? An engineering critique of 21st century 
capitalism might explain the role of the growth of shareholder power in the crisis of 
2008 and the preceding boom, but without in any way challenging the legitimacy of 
the basic property relation involved. Politics without ethics is directionless, while 
ethics without politics is ineffectual. Moral economy seeks to combine them. 
 
Once economic institutions and practices have become established, these normative 
questions tend to be forgotten, and a shift takes place from the normative to the 
normalised or naturalized (de Goede, 2005). Indeed, legitimations of the arrangements 
may scarcely be needed. Few economic institutions result simply from democratic 
deliberation about what is fair. Most are products of power. Thus it is not questioned 
why employees should have no ownership rights over the goods they make, or why 
absentee shareholders should be entitled to a share of profits. Unless, we challenge 
such arrangements, they are likely to remain. As Habermas commented, through such 
normalisation, questions of validity are turned into questions of behaviour (Habermas, 
1979, p.6). While the powerful may be careful to ensure that their economic activities 
are described in ways that legitimize them, this is not the only major factor in their 
acceptance. As Bourdieu argued. acquiescence is often less a product of ideology or 
dominant discourses, than the facticity of the social world in which people act. It is 
primarily a product of habituation to subordinate positions and lack of experience of 
alternatives which produces a bodily attunement to them (2000, p.181): “ ... of all the 
forms of ‘hidden persuasion’, the most implacable is the one exerted, quite simply, by 
the order of things.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 168, emphasis in original).  
 
 
As an object of study, some have defined moral economies in opposition to market 
economies, as Edward Thompson famously did, but unlike him, though like many 
more recent users of the term, I regard all economies as moral economies in some 
respects (Arnold, 2001; Booth, 1994; Keat, 2012; Murphy, 1994; Sayer, 2007; 
Thompson, 1971), for all invoke some sort of moral/ethical justifications for their key 
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institutions – even, as we shall see, neoliberalism.  Again, this is not to imagine that 
these justifications have much to do with the formation of economic institutions, for 
this typically depends on power: they primarily serve as rationalisations of the already 
established. Hence the need to subject them to critical assessment. 
 
To illustrate the kind of ethical critique that moral economy can provide, I next  
discuss three crucial but often overlooked distinctions that reveal much of what is 
ethically questionable about our most familiar economic institutions and practices. 
These are the distinction between earned and unearned income, and the related 
distinction between property and ‘improperty’, and thirdly ‘investment’ in the senses 
of wealth creation and of wealth extraction. While these have been noted in critiques 
of capitalism, they have fallen out of use in recent decades, even though they have 





One of the most powerful ways of exposing what is unjust about our economic system 
is through the old distinction between earned and unearned income. This has fallen 
out of use in the last 40 years, just when unearned income has expanded enormously. 
 
Earned income is what waged and salaried employees and self-employed people get 
for producing goods and services. I don’t mean to suggest that the size of their pay 
reflects what they deserve but that their pay is at least conditional on contributing to 
the provision of goods and services that others can use. The relation between what we 
might think people deserve for their work - however we might want to measure that - 
and the amount of pay they actually get is pretty loose. Nevertheless, their income is 
earned in the sense that it’s work-based, and the goods or services they help to 
produce and deliver have ‘use-value’, such as the nutritious and tasty quality of a 
meal, or the educational benefits of a maths lesson, or the warmth provided by a 
heating system. So there are two criteria here: earned income is dependent not just on 
working, but on work that contributes directly or indirectly to producing use-values. 
This is important, because as we’ll see shortly, it’s possible to work without 
producing any useful goods or services, and indeed in a way that merely extracts 
money from others without creating anything in return.  
 
Unearned income is very different. It is not conditional on contributing to the 
production of new goods and services but can be extracted by those who control an 
already-existing asset, such as land or a building or equipment, that others lack but 
need or want, and who can therefore be charged for its use. The recipients of this 
unearned income can get it regardless of whether they are capable of working and 
hence of earning an income, and regardless of whether those who have to pay 
consider it fair. If the asset, say a house, already exists, then there are no costs of 
production apart from maintenance costs. Those who receive unearned income from 
existing assets do so not because they are in any sense ‘deserving’ or because they are 
judged by others as needy and unable to provide for themselves, but because they can. 
It’s power based on unequal ownership and control of key assets. In most cases they 
have this power of control by virtue of property rights that legally entitle them to 
control an existing asset and dispose of it as they wish. This unearned income is asset-
based. The recipient is a rentier. As John Stuart Mill said of landlords, they "grow 
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rich in their sleep without working, risking or economising.”(Mill, 1848). Mere 
ownership, whether it is of land, buildings, money, or technology produces nothing, 
but can be used for extracting value from others. As we shall see, neoliberalism has 
promoted unearned income, producing what we might reasonably call a something-
for-nothing economy for the asset-rich. 
 
J.A.Hobson, writing in the 1930s, coined the term ‘improperty’ to refer to the 
ownership of assets not for direct use but for extracting income from others. For 
example, whereas a house that someone owns and uses as their home is an example of 
property, a house that is owned just to provide a source of unearned income in the 
form of rent and capital gains, is improperty (Hobson, 1937). Similarly for Tawney, 
property was for direct use or as an aid to work, not as a source of income irrespective 
of this (Tawney, 1920). Hence one can, without contradiction, be against improperty 
and yet be in favour of private, as well as collective forms of property. 
 
There’s a further question about unearned income that unfortunately is all too often 
overlooked: How can it be possible for someone to live without producing anything? 
If they’re consuming goods and services – in the case of the rich, in vast quantities – 
but not contributing to their production, then who is producing them? The answer can 
only be this: for it to be possible for some to consume without producing, others who 
are producing goods and services must be producing more than they themselves 
consume. In other words, others must be producing a surplus. Even though those 
workers may be getting a wage or salary, part of their work must be unpaid. And it 
was not only Marx who realised this: It is implicit in Adam Smith’s charge that 
landlords “love to reap where they have not sowed” (Smith, 1776, Bk 1, ch. V, p.56.) 
and, again, in John Stuart Mill’s challenge: “If some of us grow rich in our sleep, 
where do we think this wealth is coming from?  It doesn't materialize out of thin 
air.  It doesn't come without costing someone, another human being.   It comes from 
the fruits of others' labours, which they don't receive.“ (Mill, 1848, Principles of 
Political Economy, Bk.v, Ch. II) Or as, later, Tawney put it, “The man who lives by 
owning without working is necessarily supported by the industry of someone else, and 
is, therefore, too expensive a luxury to be encouraged.” (Tawney, 1929, p.80). The 
unearned income is not extracted through any deceipt or fraud, yet for most people, its 
dependence on the unpaid labour of others – a hidden subsidy - goes unnoticed. To 
echo Bastiat, improperty is authorized by the legal system, and supported by a 





Rent is the clearest example of unearned income based on improperty. Interest, as 
money’s rent, is another, albeit less recognised case, today, though historically, as 
usury, it has been known and reviled for millennia, and often prohibited (Graeber, 
2012). There has been a wide range of critiques of usury, both religious and secular, 
but their strongest argument against it is that it allows the strong to take advantage of 
the weak. We can see this phenomenon in cases as different as payday loans and the 
Greek debt crisis. In everyday life we apply double standards to interest. If we felt it 
necessary to borrow from a well-off friend we would not expect them to charge us 
interest or have the right to seize our property if we couldn’t repay them, and if they 
                                                        
1 In a piece condemning landlordism, the young Winston Churchill described rent as a payment 
for a ‘disservice’. Churchill, W. (1909) from chapter 4 of The people’s rights 
http://www.wealthandwant.com/docs/Churchill_TPL.html 
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did we would object strongly because it would be clear that they were using their 
relative strength to take advantage of our weakness. But where impersonal economic 
relations are concerned, we tend to accept interest as normal and legitimate. 
Obviously, the seriousness of the injustice of usury is relative to the size of the debt 
charges and the inequalities between lender and borrower, and the equivalent goes for 
other kinds of unearned income. Even though payment of interest means that there is 
a net flow of money from the debtor to the creditor, and often the weak to the strong, 
it is typically the lender who is seen as the benefactor and the debtor who is seen as 
dependent and morally inferior. Interest charges are often defended as a way of 
protecting lenders from risk, but the greater the inequality between the lender and the 
debtor, the easier it is for the lender to refuse to reduce debt charges and hence avoid 
risk, as we currently see in the relations between Greece, Germany and the IMF. 
Rates of interest and their enforcement reflect power, not merely risk. As a debtor 
unable to repay debts, creditors demand of Greece that it sell off assets like ports, 




Money-creation itself has now largely been privatized, as private banks are allowed to 
create 97% of money as credit. Further, since they lend very little to business (c.10% 
of bank lending in the UK) and instead mostly lend against existing property, little of 
their income in interest derives from productive investment (Turner, 2009). They are 
effectively allowed to charge a private tax on borrowers. Excessive lending against 
property inflates its value and facilitates wealth extraction as interest (for lenders) and 
capital gains for owners, not wealth creation. In the last two years, house prices have 
inflated by up to £200,000 in one London Borough (Guardian, 18
th
 March 2015). 
Now, in the UK, 20% of households – mainly young, single and living in the South-
East – are having to spend over half their income on housing (Resolution Foundation, 
April 2015), and this of course means taking on more debt and paying more interest to 
lenders. 
 
The enormous increase in private debt during the neoliberal era has been accompanied 
by a concerted effort on the part of lenders to rid debt of its traditional associations of 
dependence and burdens, and to present it more appealingly as ‘credit’, and in the 
case of mortgages and perhaps student loans, as aids to ‘investment’ in appreciating 
assets. In effect, the borrower is invited to see credit as liberating, and as a vote of 
confidence in their economic prospects. Yet of course, debt burdens have increased, 
and with that the net flow of payments from debtors to lenders. In Britain and 
Germany, only the top 10% of households in the income distribution receive more in 
interest payments than they pay out, so interest or usury creates an escalator 
transferring money from the bottom and the middle to the top (Hodgson, 2013; Creutz, 
cited in Kennedy, 2012). 
 
In classical political economy, profit is the third member of this trio of sources of 
unearned income. The profits of private (productive) employers derive from their 
ownership of the means of production and the product, and the dependency of non-
owners of means of production on them for employment. Pure capitalists – that is 
ones who just own their firms and delegate management to others – are not 
contributing to wealth creation, but merely using their power relative to those of 
propertyless workers to appropriate the difference between costs and the value of 
                                                        
2 http://www.wsj.com/articles/greece-open-to-selling-all-its-major-ports-1402070040 
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what the workers (and managers) produce. Since mere ownership produces nothing, 
their income is unearned. For working capitalists, those who are not only owners but 
managers, their income is a mixture of both earned and unearned.  
 
Relatedly, shares provide another gateway to this unearned income. Since the vast 
majority of share transactions are in the secondary market, the money paid for such 
purchases goes to the previous owner, not the company, and thus cannot be claimed to 
be a payment that contributes to any objective productive investment. The 
extraordinary feature of share ownership is not so much limited liability (for losses 
made by the company), but that it provides a potentially indefinite source of unearned 
income - an unlimited asset. Both dividends and gains from trading shares are 
unearned income. Since growth of demand for shares has exceeded the growth of 
supply in recent decades, average prices have tended to rise too, creating bubbles, so 
this source has proved lucrative (Engelen et al, 2011). The development over the last 
30 years of the shareholder value movement – a highly successful rentier campaign 
driven by the rise of major institutional shareholders such as pension funds – coupled 
with the weakening of trade unions, has made share prices the primary concern of the 
management of companies. Firms that fail to deliver rising share prices – for example, 
by ploughing most of their profits into productive investment instead of distributing 
them as dividends – are disciplined by the market for companies as they become 
vulnerable to takeover by managements that will deliver shareholder value. 
 
The most glaring but rarely asked questions here are: why are absentee, uncommitted 
shareholders the prime stakeholders in firms? Why are workers/employees (present, 
committed and dependent), who produce the goods and services on which the firm 
depends, not stakeholders? Why is it you can work for a firm for years and have no 
say in what happens to the revenue which your work helps to raise, while a rich 
outsider who has never contributed anything to it can buy up the firm and do what 
they like with it, including making you redundant if it suits them? The answer is 
because they can, and they can because that is what the rules allow and they have the 
power to take advantage of them.  
 
As recipients of unearned income based on improperty, rentiers are often seen as 
passive, as in Mill’s portrayal. Yet many of the rich dissociate themselves from this 
image of passive free-riding by calling themselves ‘the working rich’. Some may 
indeed get most of their income in the form of salary rather than rent or interest or 
dividends or capital gains. But many of these are working for rentier organizations, 
whose revenue comes from rent, interest and speculation, so their salary is actually 
paid out of such unearned income. Some may work hard to compete for new and 
bigger sources of unearned income, and this is effectively what many involved in the 
financial and property sectors do. In addition, chief executive officers - whether inside 
or outside the rentier sectors – can use their power – to pay themselves extraordinary 
salaries, provided they keep the shareholders – the ‘functionless investors’ as Keynes 
called them – happy with generous dividends and rising share prices. In the post-war 
boom, CEOs in the US were paid 24 times as much as the average worker. There are 
now 8 US CEOs who are paid more than a 1000 times average pay.
3
 The immediate 
                                                        
3 Stanford University Centre on Poverty and Inequality, 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/scspi/cgi-bin/facts.php; Smith, E.B. and Kunt, P. (2103)’CEO 
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cause of this extraordinary change is not a miraculous increase in their managerial 
skills but the self-interested excesses of remuneration committees (the ‘Ratchet, 
Ratchet and Bingo’ compensation consultants, as billionaire Warren Buffett called 
them).
4
 But enabling this growth of legalised extortion is the weakening of organised 
labour and the strengthening of rentier power in the form of the shareholder value 
movement and financial deregulation.  
 
Our third vital distinction concerns investment. One of the most common 
justifications of many sources of unearned income
5
 is that they are ‘investments’. This 
trades on a slippage in the use of the word that is central to the legitimation of the rich, 
and their symbolic domination. Investment is invariably understood to be a good thing, 
and can provide an appealing cover for a vast range of activities, yet the term is used 
in two radically different senses: 
 
(1) Use-value/object-oriented definitions focus on what it is that is invested in 
(e.g. infrastructure, equipment, training), i.e. on wealth creation – creating 
new ways of producing goods and services. 
 
(2) Exchange-value/‘investor’-oriented definitions focus on the financial gains 
from any kind of lending, saving, purchase of financial assets or speculation – 
regardless of whether they contribute to any objective investment (1), or 
benefit others. Here the focus is wealth extraction.  
 
This is not just an academic distinction: the difference between the two activities is of 
enormous practical importance for both economic growth and wealth distribution. 
 
This distinction is almost always elided, allowing the second to be passed off as based 
on the first. Sometimes the two may indeed go together. But it is also perfectly 
possible for successful investments in the first sense to fail to provide financial 
benefits to ‘investors’ in the second sense. The use of my taxes for investing in 
infrastructure on the other side of the country may benefit others but not me. 
Conversely, it is equally possible for lucrative ‘investments’ in the second sense to 
have neutral or negative effects on productive capacity - through, asset stripping, 
value-skimming, and rent-seeking. The slippage between the two meanings has 
become common not so much through a desire to deceive than through ignorance, 
coupled with the fact that under capitalism individuals have little or no interest in 
checking whether their ‘investments’ (2) have positive, neutral or negative effects on 
the production of goods and services; to the rentier-’investor’, £1million from rent is 
no different from £1million from new productive capacity. Further for particular 
‘investors’, though not for whole economies, purely extractive kinds of ‘investment’ 
                                                                                                                                                              




5 As I argue in Why We Can’t Afford the Rich other sources of unearned income include ‘value-
skimming’ (fees charged for arranging financial deals such as mergers and takeovers and for 
rent-seeking and arranging tax dodging), many forms of speculation, and of course, inheritance 




such as speculating on asset bubbles can be less risky than objective, wealth-creating 
investment. Given the huge difference between these two meanings of the same word, 
and the contingent relation between the practices to which they refer, we must be on 
our guard when rich or super-rich individuals – or indeed small-time rentiers - justify 
their wealth by claiming to be ‘investors’. 
 
Arguments from the standpoint of individual liberty focus on the freedom of formally 
equal individuals to contract with one another, whether lending or borrowing, or 
renting, or agreeing to an employment contract, as if these were like buying and 
selling of goods and services.  Allowing individuals to contract freely seems 
reasonable in the abstract, but when one thinks in more concrete terms about 
situations in which the contracting parties are unequal in power and improperty is 
extensive – the dominant situation in many societies – then the implications are very 
different. The individualistic model of the economy helps draw attention away from 
the domination of economies by powerful multinationals with annual turnovers in 
excess of many countries GDP. Thus, speculation is passed off by appealing to people 
as naturally inclined to make ‘investments’, as a matter of prudence, and indeed 
responsibility, when improperty is inevitably concentrated in the hands of a wealthy 
minority.  
 
It is common also to pass off improperty as property by appealing to the rights of the 
property owner to use and dispose of her property as she wishes. Given that what is at 
one time property can become improperty at another, then where the rules concerning 
the former do not debar the latter they can be used to legitimise it – for example, when 
a farmer decides to switch from growing crops on their land to using it as a source of 
rent. Exploitative practices may have innocent, clean origins. And extensive 
improperty of course produces inequality, transferring wealth from those who have 
limited income based on work, to asset owners, and the greater this inequality the 
greater the dependence of the former on the latter, though of course the asset rich are 
dependent on workers for producing the goods which gives their money value. The 
more unequal a society, the easier it is for the asset rich to free ride on the asset poor. 
 
Where moral justifications of economic practices are hard to find, apologists often 
appeal to a utilitarian argument, attributed to Adam Smith in his famous example of 
the butcher, the baker and the brewer, who, in competing with others find it in their 
self-interest to give customers what they want. I say ‘attributed’ to Smith firstly 
because he was writing when capitalism (‘commercial society’) was in its infancy and 
the baker and co were clearly tiny businesses, not the likes of Microsoft or Monsanto 
(Smith, 1776). (Smith also warned of the dangers to the public of monopoly, which 
was always capable of arising spontaneously out of competition.) Secondly, because 
he was well aware that market relations were entangled with other social relations in 
which moral considerations were always important, he certainly did not believe the 
pursuit of self-interest should be unlimited, and he was not a utilitarian. As he put it: 
“The wise and virtuous man is at all times willing that his own private interest should 
be sacrificed to the public interest of his own particular order or society” (Smith, 1759 
pt VI, sec ii, ch 3.1, p 235).
6
 And as we have already seen, he certainly didn’t see the 
landlords’ self-interest in ‘reaping where they have not sowed’ in a favourable light. 
                                                        
6 Smith, A. (1759) The theory of the moral sentiments, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, pt VI, sec ii, ch 




Finally, unearned income based on improperty is not only unjust but dysfunctional – a 
deadweight cost - since it diverts resources away from the productive economy. We 
need either to block or heavily tax it, in fact I suggest we tax earned income less and 
unearned income more. Is it not bizarre that we think it’s OK to tax the income of 
those who work to provide goods and services for others, so they share in the burdens 




Neoliberalism and the promotion of improperty 
 
A central but often overlooked feature of neoliberal policies is that they enlarge the 
sphere of improperty, while presenting this as wealth creation rather than wealth 
extraction. In the UK, the enforced sale of public housing and housing association 
properties and the subsidization of buy-to-let housing are among the clearest 
examples. Housing becomes about private gain, not providing homes, improperty not 
property. Far from enabling people to become more independent they lead to 
dependence on rentiers, whether banks for mortgages or landlords for property to rent, 
so having a home becomes conditional upon supplying them with unearned income.  
Consequently rents are now higher in Britain than anywhere in Europe, both in 
absolute terms and relative to income, while the value of buy-to-let properties now 
nears £1 trillion. While this conversion of property into improperty has enlarged 
wealth extraction, real investment in new housing – wealth creation – has suffered, 
falling to just 3% of UK GDP between 1996 and 2011, compared to 6% in Germany 




Privatisation of public utilities such as water and energy obliges consumers to provide 
companies with what James Meek calls ‘a human revenue stream’ that has to satisfy 
shareholders’ considerable short-term demands, and these in turn sharply constrain 
long-term investment (Meek, 2012). Although, the companies are supposed to 
compete, they avoid price competition by ‘confusion marketing’, that is offering 
complex deals that combine high margin and low margin elements in ways that defy 
comparison, and by securitizing their revenue from consumers into the future 
(Bowman et al, 2014; Allen and Pryke, 2013).  Water bills have nearly doubled since 
privatisation (Giles, 2012), but this is no longer the government’s responsibility. 
 
Cutbacks to transfer payments via the welfare state have been complemented by the 
expansion of sources of rentier income, sometimes referred to as ‘asset-based welfare’. 
According to neoliberal moral economy, the prudent, ‘financially-literate’ individual 
is supposed to buy assets like shares or buy-to-let housing in order to provide 
themselves with a pension. New Labour moralised it in terms of the duty of everyone 
to “to accept responsibility to take care of one’s own future consumption needs within 
                                                                                                                                                              
after the 5th and final edition of The wealth of nations). Smith also theorized self-interest in ways 





the context of increasing state retreat from the arena of welfare provision” (Watson, 
2009, p.43). Asset-based welfare is of course an oxymoron, for the income is not 
democratically approved on criteria of need, but is acquired simply on the basis of 
private ownership and ‘investment’ in the second, wealth extraction sense, and at the 
expense of others, without their knowledge let alone their consent. Without any 
official acknowledgement, this construction of supposedly free market forces has the 
effect of obliging the asset-poor to further subsidize the asset-rich. As Matthew 
Watson comments, this also “changed the role of the state from direct securing of 
distinct patterns of housing tenure to securing a macroeconomic environment in 
which mortgage lending conditions produce continual upward pressure on house 
prices” (Watson, 2009, p.48). Improperty is both a cause and effect of inequality; the 
larger economic inequalities are, the greater the opportunities for asset-based wealth 
extraction. Extraordinarily, this has not yet proved an electoral liability.  This is 
presumably because (1) the media and politics are dominated by the upper reaches of 
the top 1%, (2) many of the merely well-off have stakes in improperty, and (3) the 
argument is simply not known in popular culture as the social relations of improperty 
have become thoroughly normalized. 
 
At a larger scale, structural adjustment policies imposed by the IMF and World Bank 
make loans conditional upon selling off public property to corporations where it can 
serve as improperty. As Susan George put it, “Debt is an efficient tool. It ensures 
access to other peoples’ raw materials and infrastructure on the cheapest possible 
terms.” (George, 1990). Usury is not only a means to unearned income in the form of 
debt charges but a way of dispossessing debtors of their assets. The expansion of 
improperty and rent-seeking loom large in trade deals such as the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership and the Trans Pacific Pact currently under construction. 
These are undemocratic in conception and anti-democratic in intent, being designed in 
secret by corporate lawyers to enable big companies to pursue rent-seeking, 
unhampered by policies of elected governments, for example, for safeguarding 
employment protection, health or the environment. Precedents of these treaties are 
already allowing companies to sue governments that impede them for millions (Sayer, 
2014).  Typically, the treaties are defended as expanding free trade, cutting ‘red tape’, 
and increasing economic growth. 
 
But again, legitimation depends not only on rhetoric, but on how things superficially 
appear. Thus, it is of crucial importance for the legitimation of capitalist economies 
that they operate ‘without regard for persons’, as Weber put it: anyone, in principle, 
can be a capitalist or rentier or receive an inheritance. This allows those who are 
critical of them to be dismissed as failures – ‘if you’re so clever, why aren’t you rich?’ 
as the American saying goes – or merely envious. It’s also important that it’s possible 
for many to benefit in very small ways from the arrangements that allow a tiny 
minority to benefit hugely. Thus, those who Engelen et al call ‘the fortunate forty per 
cent’ in the UK may make receive modest amounts of unearned income, for example, 
through capital gains in the housing market and indirectly through their pension funds 
where these are ‘invested’ in securities (Engelen et al, 2012). Significantly, the small-
time recipients of unearned income are usually dependent on major rentiers such as 
pension funds and banks for mortgages for access to their capital gains. More 
generally, neoliberal discourse invites people to see themselves as free and equal 
choosers, rather than acting under duress within unequal economic relationships such 






Improperty allows huge concentrations of economic power in private hands, so much 
so that the wealth of the richest 1000 people in Britain now stands at £547 billion, 
over four times the size of the National Health Service Budget. With this goes 
political power. As we have seen in the financial crisis it allows those who have 
benefitted most from improperty to hold their countries to ransom when their attempts 
to expand their take from the rest of the economy precipitate crises. And the 
combined wealth of the 85 richest people on the planet now equals the total wealth of 
the poorest half of the world’s population. Bastiat’s insight might be re-phrased: 
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